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Competence to Stand Trial in Florida*
BRUCE J. WINICK** AND TERRY L. DEMEO***
The Florida law of competence to stand trial has recently
undergone a number of significant reforms and innovations. To
achieve these reforms and to protect the rights of incompetent
defendants adequately, criminal defense attorneys, prosecu-
tors, judges, and professionals in mental health must acquaint
themselves with these changes. The authors analyze the new
rules and statutory provisions and discuss how the courts will
interpret and apply these new provisions in light of case law
and constitutional mandates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida, as in all jurisdictions, a criminal defendant incom-
petent to stand trial cannot be tried. 1 Long recognized in Florida,
the incompetency doctrine evolved from the common law premise
that the state should not prosecute an individual if he lacks the
capacity to participate adequately in the proceedings.' The con-
temporary basis for an incompetency designation is a judicial de-
termination that the defendant, as a result of mental impairment,
is incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against
him or of assisting in his defense. The doctrine is justified as a
means of protecting the integrity of the adversarial criminal pro-
ceeding through promotion of the accuracy, fairness, and dignity of
the trial process.8 The Supreme Court of Florida has emphasized
that the purpose of the doctrine "is to protect the accused-to
make sure that he will be able to assist his counsel in preparing the
1. Perkins v. Mayo, 92 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1957).
2. One can trace the origins of this doctrine back to mid-17th century England. GROUP
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, COMM. ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, MISUSE OF PSYCHIA-
TRY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 912-15 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY]. Blackstone wrote that a defendant who became "mad" after the
commission of an offense should not be arraigned, "because he is not able to plead ... with
the advice and caution that he ought," and should not be tried, for "how can he make his
defense?" 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24 (9th ed. 1783). See also M. HALE, THE HIS-
TORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34 (1847). Some commentators have traced the common
law prohibition on trying the incompetent defendant to the ban on trials in absentia. Foote,
A Comment on Pre-trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834
(1960); see, e.g., Frith's Case, 22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790); Kinloch's Case, 18 How. St. Tr.
395 (1746). Others have traced the origins of the doctrine to the difficulties that resulted
when a defendant frustrated the ritual of the English common law trial by remaining mute
instead of pleading to the charges. Slovenko, The Developing Law on Competency to Stand
Trial, 5 J. PSYCH. & L. 168 (1977); MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, supra, at 887-88, 912-13.
3. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 408 (rev. ed. 1971);
Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REV. 454, 457-59 (1967).
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best defense possible to the crime with which he is charged."'4 In
fact, both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Florida have indicated that conviction of an incompetent
person would violate due process.5
Few areas of the law have undergone as rapid a change in re-
cent years as the law of competency to stand trial. Until recently,
incompetent defendants faced automatic commitment to mental
hospitals for what was, in effect, an indeterminate sentence. 6 Many
hospitalized defendants never regained their competency, and
those who did remained institutionalized for lengthy periods; hos-
pital staff often failed to notice their improvement-and some-
times ignored it. 7 The period of confinement for incompetent de-
fendants was lengthy, often exceeding the maximum sentence for
the crime charged e and occasionally lasting a lifetime.9
In 1972, the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana,1"
which placed significant constitutional limits on the power of the
4. Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So. 2d 144, 147 (Fla. 1971), appeal dismissed as moot sub
nom. Daniels v. Hirshberg, 406 U.S. 902 (1972).
5. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 388 (1966) (dictum); accord, Martin v. Estelle, 546
F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1977); Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir. 1973), overruled in
part on other grounds, Zapata v. Estelle, 585 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Tait, 387 So.
2d 338 (Fla. 1980).
6. D. WEXLER, CRIMINAL COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS: LEGAL IS-
SUES OF CONFINEMENT, TREATMENT, AND RELEASE 38 (DHEW Pub. No. 76-331, 1976); Gobert,
Competency to Stand Trial: A Pre- and Post-Jackson Analysis, 40 TENN. L. REv. 659, 685
(1973). A statutory survey in 1971 revealed that 42 states required automatic hospitaliza-
tion. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 3, at 415, 444-50 (Table 11.2). As of March 1979, as
many as 19 states and the District of Columbia still provided for automatic and indefinite
commitment. Roesch & Golding, Treatment and Disposition of Defendants Found Incom-
petent to Stand Trial: A Review and a Proposal, 2 INT'L J.L. & PSYCH. 349, 357, 358-61
(Table 2).
7. See, e.g., McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for Trial and
Mental Illness: Review and Preview, 49 B.U. L. REv. 46, 50-51 (1969).
8. SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAW RE-
LATING TO INCOMPETENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 72-73 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as SPECIAL COMMITTEE]; Engelberg, Pretrial Commitment to Mental Institutions: The Pro-
cedure in Massachusetts and Suggested Reform, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 163, 165 (1967); Hess
& Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results, and Problems, 119 AM. J.
PSYCH. 713, 716 (1963); Roesch & Golding, supra note 6, at 349-50; Winick, Psychotropic
Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 769,
792.
9. SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 214-15; A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A
SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 203 (DHEW Pub. No. 76-176, 1976); Hess & Thomas, supra note 8,
at 717-18; McGarry, Curran, & Kenefick, Problems of Public Consultation in Medical Legal
Matters, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 42, 44; Winick, supra note 8, at 792; Note, supra note 3, at 456.
10. 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see D. WEXLER, supra note 6, at 38-41; Gobert, supra note 6;
notes 80-81 & 130 and accompanying text infra.
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states to commit incompetent defendants, drastically changed this
situation. Jackson caused a substantial revision of state procedures
for incompetency commitment, although perhaps half of the states
have not yet enacted legislation consistent with its requirements."
Florida was one of the first jurisdictions to respond to this
landmark case, revising Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210 within
months of the Jackson decision."m
In the years since 1972, the Florida law governing competence
to stand trial has been revised frequently. Is On July 1, 1980, a new
Florida statute" and rule of criminal procedure'8 took effect.
These new provisions created a number of significant changes in
the law of competency in Florida, which other jurisdictions con-
11. Roesch & Golding, supra note 6, at 357.
I12. FLA. R. CiuM. P. 3.210, In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65
(Fla. 1972). The Supreme Court of Florida adopted the former rule in 1967, before which
the procedure appeared in FLA. STAT. § 917.01 (1967). Note, Florida's Incompetency-to-
Stand-Trial Rule: A Possible Life Sentence? 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 523, 525 n.8 (1976).
13. The Supreme Court of Florida amended rule 3.210 on February 10, 1977, effective
July 1, 1977. 343 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1977). The rule was repealed, effective September 29,
1977 by 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-312, which contained a new statutory formulation of the law
on competency. In 1978 the court found unconstitutional the bifurcated trial system estab-
lished by 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-312, § 1 for the trial of insanity cases. State ex rel. Boyd v.
Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978). Finding that § 10, which replaced provisions of ch. 77-312,
depended on the bifurcated trial provision, the court reinstated former FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.210. Id. at 795. This rule continued to govern competence to stand trial until October 1,
1979, when ch. 79-336, § 4 and ch. 79-400 made effective FLA. STAT. §§ 394.02 and 394.03.
Chapter 79-336 repealed FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.210 and reenacted ch. 77-312 with a number of
modifications. On October 9, 1979, the Supreme Court of Florida issued Transition Rule
23(a), 375 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1979), which adopted as a court rule those sections of ch. 79-336
that were procedural in nature, and further provided that
[a]t the initial hearing held pursuant to Fla. Stat. 394.902, the court shall
consider the following issues:
a. Whether the defendant is competent to stand trial;
b. If it is determined by the court that the defendant is not competent to
stand trial, whether the defendant meets the criteria for involuntary
hospitalization.
375 So. 2d at 855. By adopting as a court rule the statutory provisions that were procedural
in nature, the court avoided what otherwise would have been a substantial constitutional
question concerning the legislature's power to adopt at least some of the statutory provi-
sions governing competence to stand trial. See In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Pract.
& Proc., 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973); Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure
in Florida Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. Rzy. 442 (1980).
14. FLA. STAT. §§ 916.11-.14, 916.16-.17 (Supp. 1980).
15. FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.210-.214, In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 389 So. 2d
610 (Fla. 1980). The current statute apparently avoids the separation of powers problem, see
Means, supra note 13, by leaving procedural matters to the revised Florida Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. The Court Rules Steering Committee of the Florida Bar drafted these rules
in conjunction with the current statutory provisions to avoid conflict and constitutional
difficulties.
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templating similar revisions will undoubtedly examine closely. This
article analyzes the new Florida provisions and relevant state and
Federal case law on competency, and discusses how the courts will
interpret these provisions in light of developing constitutional
requirements.
II. THE COMPETENCY STANDARD
A. The Dusky Standard
Early formulations of the competency standard in Florida case
law appeared in Deeb v. State"6 and Southworth v. State." The
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dusky v. United
States,1 8 however, provides the current Florida standard. That case
set forth the competency criteria for federal cases: "whether [the
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceed-
ings against him."1' 9 In the view of several courts, due process re-
quires the Dusky standard. 0 Florida Statutes section 925.22(1)
(1980) and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211(a) have
adopted the standard, verbatim.'1
Significantly, the inquiry into trial competence is a narrow
one. Thus, a diagnosis that the defendant is "mentally ill" does not
in itself justify a finding of incompetency." To satisfy the test, the
defendant's illness must render him incapable of understanding
the nature of the proceedings against him and of assisting in his
defense. Contrary to the tendency of some psychiatric evaluators
to confuse the determination of incompetency with a diagnosis of
psychosis, a defendant can be severely mentally ill-even overtly
psychotic-and still be competent to stand trial.23 A medical diag-
nosis of psychosis or the existence of particular descriptive symp-
16. 118 Fla. 88, 158 So. 880 (1935) (en banc).
17. 98 Fla. 1184, 1190, 125 So. 345, 347 (1929).
18. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
19. Id. at 402.
20. Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1042 (5th Cir. 1973), overruled in part on other
grounds, Zapata v. Estelle, 585 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1978); Noble v. Sigler, 351 F.2d 673, 677
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 853 (1966).
21. 389 So. 2d 610, 618 (Fla. 1980).
22. Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122
AM. J. PSYCH. 616, 617 (1975); see Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969); United States v. Horowitz, 360 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
23. Robey, supra note 22, at 617; e.g., Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962).
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toms is therefore not dispositive of the legal question of compe-
tence to stand trial. Moreover, a history of some previous mental
disorder or admission to a mental institution should not alone
serve as proof of incompetence to stand trial.2 5 A mentally ill indi-
vidual should not be found incompetent unless his illness substan-
tially interferes with his ability to play the role of defendant in the
criminal process.
B. Incompetence Distinguished from Insanity at the Time of
the Offense
An incompetency determination is not synonomous with an in-
quiry into criminal responsibility or, as many describe it, insanity
at the time of the offense.' More specifically, the Dusky standard
is distinct from the M'Naghten rule governing legal insanity, the
test under which Florida courts determine whether a defendant
had, at the time of the offense, the mental capacity to be responsi-
ble for his alleged criminal act.27 Although the inapplicability of
the M'Naghten rule to considerations of incompetency seems to be
obvious, prior formulations of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.210 used the misleading phrase "insanity at the time of trial,"
which occasionally confused lawyers, judges, and psychiatrists
about the appropriate legal standard for incompetency.'6
Indeed, a defendant may not have been mentally ill at the
time of the alleged offense, but may nevertheless be incompetent
to stand trial. The primary issue in an incompetency appraisal is
24. See Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Separating Those Unfit
for Adversary Combat from Those Who are Fit, 66 Ky. L.J. 666, 676 (1978); United States
v. Adams, 297 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (finding of paranoid schizophrenia does not
automatically require finding of incompetence).
25. Newman v. Missouri, 394 F. Supp. 83, 91 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
26. Martin v. Estelle, 546 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1977); Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d at
1039-42; Walcott v. United States, 407 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879
(1969); Deeb v. State, 118 Fla. 88, 92, 158 So. 880, 882 (1935) (en banc). Psychiatric evalu-
ators often confuse these issues. S. HALLECK, LAW IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY: HAND-
BOOK FOR CLINICIANs 233-34 (1980); A. MATTHRWs, JR., MENTAL DISABILrrY AND THE CRIMI-
NAL LAW: A FIELD STUDY 85 (1970); A. STONE, supra note 9, at 202-03; Hess & Thomas,
supra note 8. Indeed, measuring competency to stand trial by the insanity standard has
been held to violate due process. Ex parte Harris, 592 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.
1980).
27. Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902); Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla.
3d DCA 1978); Camp v. State, 149 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). Florida courts, following
the M'Naghten rule or "right and wrong" test, have decided that "a person is insane when
he is legally precluded by mental disease from distinguishing between right and wrong at
the time of the act." 361 So. 2d at 779.
28. See, e.g., Harrison v. Settle, 151 F. Supp. 372, 375 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
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not, therefore, the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
offense, but his condition at the time of trial.
C. Incompetence Distinguished from Civil Commitment
Standards
In Florida, the legal criteria for involuntary civil commitment
to a mental hospital are whether the person, as a result of mental
illness, is likely to injure himself or others, or needs care or treat-
ment to overcome a real and present threat of substantial harm to
his well-being.2 9 Although a Florida court must consider these cri-
teria once it finds a criminal defendant incompetent to stand
trial,30 the civil commitment standards do not apply to the deter-
mination of competence, for which the court uses the Dusky
standard.
III. DETERMINING COMPETENCE
A. Raising the Issue
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) provides:
If before or during the trial the court of its own motion, or
upon motion of counsel for the defendant or for the State, has
reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally
competent to stand trial, the court shall immediately enter its
order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's
mental condition ....
In practice, the defendant's counsel usually raises the issue of the
accused's competence, although the state attorney also may bring
the issue to the court's attention. On occasion, the court will raise
the competency issue sua sponte. When counsel for defendant or
the state raises the issue by written motion for competency exami-
nation, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure require a certifi-
cate that counsel made the motion in good faith and on reasonable
grounds, and a recital of specific observations and statements of
the defendant that formed the basis for the motion.8'
Individuals other than the judge and the attorneys may ini-
tially raise the problem of the defendant's mental illness. For ex-
ample, the arresting officer may indicate in his arrest report that
the individual appears to be mentally ill; the defendant's family or
29. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) (1979).
30. See notes 118-54 and accompanying text infra.
31. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.210(b)(l)-(2).
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friends may disclose a prior history of psychological problems; or
jail officials may comment upon a defendant's bizarre behavior in
detention. In such instances, the defense attorney should inquire
further and, if appropriate, move for a hearing. This further in-
quiry should include an evaluation by an expert retained by the
defense. If the defendant is indigent, counsel may apply to the
court for the appointment of such an expert.3 2 When appointed,
such a defense expert "shall report only to the attorney for the
defendant and matters related to the expert shall be deemed to fall
under the lawyer-client privilege."83
B. Grounds for the Hearing
In Pate v. Robinson,84 the United States Supreme Court held
that a trial judge must raise the issue of competency sua sponte
when the evidence before the court creates a bona fide doubt about
the defendant's competence. Under these circumstances, trial and
conviction without determining competency, even when the
defendant does not raise the issue, violates due process and re-
quires automatic reversal.35
Florida law requires a hearing to determine competence when
a reasonable doubt exists about the defendant's competence." Al-
though Rule 3.210(b) uses the term "reasonable ground,' 8 7 courts
have construed that language as equivalent to the standard of rea-
sonable doubt.83 Once a question about the defendant's compe-
tence is raised, the focus shifts to whether there are sufficient indi-
cations on the record, i.e., reasonable grounds, to order a
competency evaluation. The courts must determine what consti-
tutes "reasonable grounds" on a case-by-case basis: "There are, of
course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the
need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the ques-
tion is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations
and subtle nuances are implicated." 9
32. Id. 3.216(a).
33. Id. See Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
34. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
35. Id. at 385; accord, Drops v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d
338 (Fla. 1980).
36. State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d at 340; Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So. 2d 144, 147 (Fla.
1971); Brock v. State, 69 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1954).
37. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b).
38. Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1388-89 (5th Cir. 1979); see, e.g., State v.
Tait, 387 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1980); Quesada v. State, 321 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
39. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
[Vol. 35:31
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The Florida cases addressing this issue agree that evidence of
a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any
prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant
in determining the need for further inquiry. General or unsup-
ported assertions that the defendant is mentally ill or unable to
confer with counsel are usually insufficient.40 Similarly insufficient
is an unsubstantiated or uncorroborated allegation of a specific
type of illness.41 Prior institutionalization is important, 45 but it
may not be sufficient in itself, especially if remote in time.'8 The
testimony of witnesses is also important in establishing a history of
irrational behavior and in corroborating allegations made in the
motion."
If sufficient evidence presents reasonable grounds for believing
that the defendant may be incapable of understanding the pro-
ceedings or of assisting in the preparation of a defense, then the
trial court's failure to make a formal inquiry denies the accused his
constitutional right to a fair trial.45 As a result, a prudent trial
judge who wishes to avoid reversal will order a competency evalua-
tion if counsel, particularly the defense, raises any doubt about
competence." Moreover, if reasonable grounds for a hearing exist,
the failure of defendant to request one does not constitute
waiver.'1
C. The Competency Examination
1. APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT EVALUATORS
If the court decides that a competency evaluation is necessary,
rule 3.210(b) requires it to appoint expert evaluators and "immedi-
ately enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the
defendant's mental condition, which shall be held no later than 20
40. Jordan v. Wainwright, 457 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1972); Walker v. State, 384 So. 2d
730, 732-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Coney v. State, 348 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
41. Robbins v. State, 312 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
42. See, e.g., Pedrero v. State, 262 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
43. Albright v. State, 191 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 862
(1967).
44. See, e.g., Meeks v. State, 289 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
45. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); State ex rel. Deeb v. Campbell, 123 Fla.
894, 167 So. 805 (1935); Mitchell v. State, 289 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
46. See Jones v. State, 362 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 1978). "In deciding whether or not to
order an examination, the trial judge must consider all the circumstances, including the
representations of counsel, and unless clearly convinced that an examination is unnecessary,
order an examination before beginning or proceeding with trial." Id. at 1336.
47. State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 1980).
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days after the date of the filing of the motion." The courts strictly
construed similar requirements in a prior rule that the court "shall
immediately fix a time for a hearing.""' One court held that the
failure to fix a time for the evaluation renders continued detention
of the defendant unlawful, justifying release on habeas corpus.4 9
The evaluators must assess the defendant's competence in
terms of a number of specified factors.5 0 If the court determines
that there is "reason to believe that the defendant may require in-
voluntary hospitalization," it must also order the experts to con-
sider this issue in their reports.' 1 The Committee Note to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210 indicates that the experts should
inquire into involuntary hospitalization not as a matter of course,
but only if the court so orders." When hospitalization of the de-
fendant appears likely to the court, it will order the experts to con-
sider the applicability of the involuntary commitment standards,
so that the court may consider at the competency hearing whether
to commit a defendant it finds incompetent. For similar considera-
tions of efficiency, if the defendant files a notice of intent to rely
on the insanity defense, then the court may also order the experts
to consider and report on the issue of the defendant's sanity at the
time of the offense.'8
Rule 3.210(b), as well as section 925.21(1) of the Florida Stat-
utes, requires that the court appoint two or three experts to deter-
mine the defendant's mental condition. Section 925.21(2) provides
that, if possible, at least one of the appointed experts shall be a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or physician employed by the state or by
a community mental health center, or designated by the district
mental health board. The testimony and evidence introduced by
the court-appointed experts, however, do not limit either party
who may introduce additional evidence at the hearing.4
In appointing the experts, the court must order that they ex-
amine the defendant before the date of the hearing, which must be
no later than twenty days from the filing of any motion for compe-
tency evaluation." The experts examine the defendant in jail, or,
48. E.g., Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1971) (construing FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.210(a)(1), adopted in 1967).
49. Lederer v. Stack, 294 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
50. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text infra.
51. FLA. R. CrIM. P. 3.211.
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for a defendant on bail or other pre-trial release, in an appropriate
local facility or other place for evaluation designated by the
court."
2. PRESENCE OF COUNSEL AT THE EXAMINATION
Traditionally, the examiner and the defendant were the only
people present at the examination. The new rules break with tradi-
tion by permitting the presence of attorneys for both the state and
the defendant.5 7 The Revision Committee based this new provision
on its assumption that the examination is a "critical stage" in the
proceedings, and therefore subject to the sixth amendment right to
counsel.5 8 The overwhelming majority of cases that have consid-
ered the sixth amendment issue, however, have reached the oppo-
site conclusion, in the context of both the evaluation of compe-
tency59 and the examination for legal insanity. 0 In fact, the
Florida Supreme Court, in the context of psychiatric examination
for civil commitment, has rejected the contention that the right to
counsel permits attorneys to be present at the interview. 1 In view
of the supreme court's concern that such presence "would unduly
interfere with the objective evaluation of the patient's mental con-
dition by the examining physician," 62 it is surprising that the court
approved the presence of counsel at the competency evaluation.
Although rule 3.210(b) authorizes the presence of counsel at
56. Id. 3.210(b)(3).
57. Id. 3.210(b).
58. Id., Committee Note.
59. United States ex rel. Stukes v. Shovlin, 464 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1972); Davis v.
Campbell, 465 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Ark. 1979); United States v. Fletcher, 329 F. Supp. 160
(D.D.C. 1971); see Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see id. at 701-02 (Bazelon, C.J.) (dictum);
Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the Criminal Commitment Process, 10 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 385, 394 (1972).
60. United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909
(1975); United States v. Trapnell, 495 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974);
United States v. Mattson, 469 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 986 (1973);
United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 787 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 796 (1971); United
States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); People v. Larsen, 74 Ill. 2d 348, 385 N.E.2d
679, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 908 (1979); People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 192 N.W.2d 215
(1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965);
State v. Wilson, 26 Ohio App. 2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 814 (1971); Commonwealth v. Stukes, 435
Pa. 535, 257 A.2d 828 (1969). Contra, In re Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 753 (1965); In re Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d
705, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
61. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977).
62. Id. at 489.
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the examination, it does not define counsel's role. As in the lineup
context," the court will probably limit counsel to observing the
proceedings, rather than actively participating by making objec-
tions and advising his client not to respond to questions.6 The
presence of counsel for the state, even as an observer, is particu-
larly troubling. The prosecutor's presence will inevitably inhibit
the defendant's responses to questions by the evaluator, thereby
reducing the accuracy of the evaluation. Moreover, any incriminat-
ing statements made by the defendant during the evaluation in the
presence of the prosecutor may raise substantial fifth amendment
problems."
The rule does not mention whether the defendant may have
his own psychiatrist or other experts observe the examination.
This observation should be permissible if the examiner does not
object. Several federal cases, however, have rejected the contention
that the defendant has the right to have his own psychiatrist pre-
sent at the examination."
3. FORM OF EXAMINATION
The actual examination may take one of several forms and
may last from about one-half hour to several hours. Regardless of
the form of examination, the examiner must apply the Dusky stan-
dard and, if so ordered, must also consider the application of the
involuntary commitment standards or the criminal responsibility
standard. The examiner, frequently a psychiatrist, typically per-
forms a standard psychiatric evaluation of the defendant, includ-
ing the taking of a history of the individual and a mental status
examination. Sometimes the examiner also performs a physical ex-
amination, although this is rarely necessary for competency
evaluation.
The history portion of the examination includes collecting in-
formation about the defendant's present illness and its cause; his
past history, including past medical history; his social history, in-
63. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1967); Uviller, The Role of the
Defense Lawyer at a Line-up in Light of the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions, 4 CRIM.
L. BULL., 273, 278, 285-86 (1968).
64. See In re Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 443-44, 267 N.E.2d 452, 458-59, 318
N.Y.S.2d 705, 714-15, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
65. See notes 88-89 and accompanying text infra.
66. Proctor v. Harris, 413 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Fletcher, 329 F.
Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1971). Contra, State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 28, 210 A.2d 763, 775-76
(1965).
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cluding work history, school performance, and prior encounters
with the law; and his family history, including relations with par-
ents and other relatives, and any problems of marital adjustment.
The mental status examination consists of collecting information
about the defendant's general appearance and behavior; his
"stream of talk," including his rate of speech and the manner in
which he expresses ideas; his "affect"- or mood; his thought con-
tent, including the existence of delusions or hallucinations; his
"sensorium," including information about the individual's orienta-
tion, his recent and remote memory, and his intelligence; and his
insight and judgment.
4. FACTORS BEARING ON COMPETENCY
If the evaluator determines that the defendant suffers from
mental illness, he should then determine whether the illness inter-
feres substantially with the defendant's ability either to under-
stand the nature of the proceedings or to participate in his defense.
Rule 3.211(a)(1) seeks to refine this aspect of the examiner's evalu-
ation by requiring consideration and analysis of the defendant's
mental condition as it affects each of the following factors:
(i) Defendant's appreciation of the charges;
(ii) Defendant's appreciation of the range and nature of possible
penalties;
(iii) Defendant's understanding of the adversary nature of the
legal process;
(iv) Defendant's capacity to disclose to attorney pertinent facts
surrounding the alleged offense;
(v) Defendant's ability to relate to attorney;
(vi) Defendant's ability to assist attorney in planning defense;
(vii) Defendant's capacity to realistically challenge prosecution
witnesses;
(viii) Defendant's ability to manifest appropriate courtroom
behavior;
(ix) Defendant's capacity to testify relevantly;
(x) Defendant's motivation to help himself in the legal process;
(xi) Defendant's capacity to cope with the stress of incarceration
prior to trial. 7
These factors represent the most comprehensive statutory at-
tempt to define competency; most states simply use the Dusky lan-
67. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.211(a)(1).
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guage, or its equivalent, without elaboration. s The Florida Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitation Services developed these
factors in its Competency Evaluation Instrument, which refined
the McGarry Competency Evaluation Procedure.6e The McGarry
checklist, developed under a federal grant from the National Insti-
tute of Health, is an attempt to objectify the competency evalua-
tion by using an assessment instrument with numerical ratings.
70
The checklist approach is controversial, and some rating instru-
ments have received criticism for built-in bias."' The rule's specifi-
cation of general factors, however, does not suffer from this prob-
lem. Moreover, such factors should provide useful guidance for the
examiner's evaluation, as well as standardizing the evaluation pro-
cess. Further standardization within each of the circuits may come
through the use of standardized report forms, which rule 3.211(d)
authorizes if the chief judge of the circuit approves them.
In probing the defendant's ability to assist his counsel in mak-
ing a defense, the evaluator should also (but probably rarely does)
consult with defense counsel to determine the nature of the de-
fense contemplated.' If a defendant intends to testify, he may
need a higher degree of competency than he would if he did not
take the stand. Similarly, he would need a higher degree of compe-
tence if he contested the charges against him than if he pleaded
guilty. The defense attorney, however, may be unable to provide
the information sought or may decline to reveal such information
for strategic reasons, particularly if asked in the presence of the
prosecutor who, under rule 3.210(b), may attend the examination.
In such cases, evaluators should draw no inferences from lack of
defense cooperation.
68. Janis, Incompetency Commitment: The Need for Procedural Safeguards and a
Proposed Statutory Scheme, 23 CATm. U.L. Rzv. 720, 720-21, 721 n.3 (1974) (statutory com-
pilation). Several state statutes supplement the general information with more detail, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:4-4 (West 1979), but none provide as much detail as the new Florida
provision.
69. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.211, Committee Note.
70. See Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Competency
to Stand Trial and Mental Illness (National Institute of Mental Health Monograph, 1973);
Lipsitt, Lelos, & McGarry, Competency for Trial: A Screening Instrument, 128 AM. J.
PSYCH. 105 (1971). Examples of other attempts to fashion an objective evaluation procedure
include Bukatman, Foy & de Grazia, What is Competency to Stand Trial? 127 AM. J.
PsYcH. 1225 (1971); Robey, supra note 22.
71. See Brakel, Presumption, Bias, and Incompetency in the Criminal Process, 1974
Wis. L. REv. 1105.
72. See Bukatman, Foy & de Grazia, supra note 70, at 1228-29.
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5. CONSIDERATION OF COMMITMENT CRITERIA
When the experts are to report on the issue of involuntary
commitment, they must consider whether the defendant meets the
criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in the Baker Act,7 3
or in the case of mental retardation, in the Retardation Prevention
and Community Services Act.7' Rule 3.211(b)(1) provides that in
determining the issue of involuntary commitment, the examining
experts shall consider and include in their report an analysis of the
following factors:
(i) The nature and extent of the mental illness or mental retar-
dation suffered by the defendant;
(ii) Whether the defendant, because of such mental illness or
mental retardation meets the criteria for involuntary hospitali-
zation or placement set forth by law;
(iii) Whether there is a substantial probability that the defen-
dant will attain competence to stand trial within the foreseeable
future;
(iv) The nature of the care and treatment to be afforded the
defendant and its probable duration;
(v) Alternatives other than involuntary hospitalization which
might be less restrictive on the defendant's liberty.
75
73. FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-.478 (1979 & Supp. 1980). The Baker Act authorizes the
involuntary commitment of a person:
if he is mentally ill, and, because of his illness, is:
1. Likely to injure himself or other if allowed to remain at liberty, or
2. In need of care or treatment which, if not provided, may result in neglect
or refusal to care for himself, and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present
threat of substantial harm to his well-being.
Id. § 394.467(1)(b).
74. FLA. STAT. §§ 393.061-.20 (1979) (as amended by 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-174, §§ 2-
4). The Retardation Act sets out the criteria that must be met before a court may approve
the involuntary admission of a mentally retarded person to residential services provided by
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services:
(a) The person is mentally retarded, and
(b) Placement in a residential setting is the least restrictive and most appropri-
ate alternative to meet his needs; and
(c) Because of his degree of retardation:
1. Lacks sufficient capacity to give express and informed consent to a volun-
tary application for services... and lacks basic survival and self-care skills to
such a degree that close supervision and habilitation in a residential setting is
necessary and if not provided would result in a real and present threat of sub-
stantial harm to the person's well-being; or
2. Is likely to injure others if allowed to remain at liberty.
Id. § 393.11(1). A Florida appellate court has ruled that the predecessor of Fla. Laws ch. 80-
174, § 3-FLA. STAT. § 393.11 (1977)-unconstitutionally violated substantive due process.
Kinner v. State, 382 So. 2d 756 (FI. 2d DCA 1980).
75. FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.211(b)(1).
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This new provision, applicable only to cases in which the court has
ordered the experts to consider the issue of involuntary commit-
ment, necessitates a more comprehensive analysis by the expert
than previously required. Moreover, by tying the commitment of
the incompetent defendant to the criteria for civil commitment,
this provision avoids problems of equal protection and procedural
due process. In the early 1970's, the overwhelming majority of
states automatically committed the incompetent defendant with-
out determining whether commitment was warranted.7  A recent
survey revealed that nineteen states and the District of Columbia
still do so. 77 This practice offends equal protection, since the in-
competent defendant's outstanding charges cannot justify his hos-
pitalization without a determination that he meets the same com-
mitment standards as civil patients, or at least that hospitalization
is likely to restore him to trial competence.7 8 In addition, the prac-
tice offends procedural due process, because although satisfaction
of the Dusky standard justifies holding the trial in abeyance, it
does not justify commitment without a new finding of fact.7 9 The
Florida procedure avoids these problems.
The Florida procedure also avoids substantive due process
problems. The factors set forth in subsections (iii) and (iv) stem
from the landmark Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Indiana,s0
which held, as a matter of fourteenth amendment substantive due
process, that a state's authority to commit an incompetent defen-
dant to a hospital solely because of his incompetence to stand trial
is limited by its ability to provide treatment that makes probable
the defendant's attainment of competence within a foreseeable
time. According to Jackson, if there is no substantial probability
that the defendant will regain competence in the foreseeable fu-
ture, or if treatment provided for a reasonable period has not suc-
ceeded in restoring him to competence, substantive due process re-
quires that the state either release the defendant or institute civil
commitment proceedings.81 Accordingly, if in response to factor
76. S. Brakel & R. Rock, supra note 3, at 415, 444-50 (Table 11.2) (42 states); Janis,
supra note 67, at 729.
77. Roesch & Golding, supra note 6, at 357, 358-61 (Table 2).
78. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724 (1972); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966).
79. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
80. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
81. Id. at 738; Garrett v. State, 390 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, No.
60,065 (Fla. Apr. 10, 1981). Due process may also require, in extreme cases, the dismissal of
charges against a defendant held for more than a "reasonable period" without restoration to
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(iii) the examiners conclude that there is no substantial probability
that the defendant will attain competence within the foreseeable
future, the state may commit the defendant only if he meets the
criteria for involuntary commitment under the Baker Act or the
Retardation Act.
Factor (v) is particularly significant. By requiring considera-
tion of alternatives "less restrictive on the defendant's liberty"
than hospitalization, the rule incorporates the "least restrictive al-
ternative" principle.85 Under this provision, if the examiner finds
the involuntary commitment standards otherwise met, he must
then consider the existence of community-based alternative pro-
grams that would be as effective as hospitalization in restoring the
defendant to trial competence.
D. Fifth Amendment Issues
Numerous federal court decisions have concluded that an ex-
amination by a government or court-appointed psychiatrist or
other expert does not violate either the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination or the rule of Miranda v. Arizona.8 Al-
though the expert examiner may testify concerning the defendant's
mental status, the fifth amendment bars the prosecution from in-
troducing the defendant's statements into evidence on the issue of
his guilt." Newly adopted Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.211(e) recognizes the fifth amendment problem by specifically
providing that:
The information contained in any motion by the defendant
for determination of competency or in any report of experts filed
under this section insofar as such report relates to the issues of
competency to stand trial and involuntary hospitalization, and
competency or determination of the likelihood of his eventual ability to stand trial. Id. at
96-97 (six-year period); see notes 123-54 and accompanying text infra.
82. See notes 113-16 and accompanying text infra.
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 344 U.S. 436 (1966); see, e.g., United States v. Greene, 497
F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Trapnell, 495
F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Handy, 454 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 846 (1972); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Campbell, 465 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Ark.
1979); Collins v. Auger, 428 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
84. Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 78-79 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996
(1978); United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alvarez,
519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Collins v. Auger, 428 . Supp. 1079 (S.D. Iowa 1977); In re Lee
v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 26 N.E.2d 452, 218 N.Y.S.2d 705, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823
(1971); see 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
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any information elicited during a hearing on competency or in-
voluntary hospitalization held pursuant to this Rule, shall be
used only in determining the mental competency to stand trial
of the defendant or the involuntary hospitalization of the
defendant.
This new provision follows Florida case law on the use of an indi-
vidual's statements made during a court-ordered examination in
the course of a civil commitment hearing 5 and in an examination
concerning legal insanity.8 Of course, if the defendant uses the re-
port of the expert for any other purpose, such as to support a de-
fense of legal insanity, he thereby waives the privilege contained in
the rule. 7 Moreover, if the defendant so uses only a part of the
report, "the State may request the production of any other portion
of that report which in fairness ought to be considered."88
The limitation of rule 3.211(e) on the use of such statements
or information also seems to prohibit the prosecution from intro-
ducing at trial other evidence derived from them, as well as their
use for impeachment purposes. Because a defendant must submit
to the examination, the court should consider his responses com-
pelled, for fifth amendment purposes. This characterization would
prohibit not only the use of the statements themselves but also,
under established fifth amendment doctrine, the use of derivative
evidence to which such statements provide connections or leads.89
When the prosecutor is present at the evaluation, as authorized by
rule 3.210(b),90 he thus may have to justify evidence he seeks to
have admitted at trial as having derived from a source indepen-
dent of the defendant's statements. 1 Moreover, because such in-
85. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 488-89" (Fla. 1977).
86. Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1970).
87. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.211(e).
88. Id.
89. Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 761-65, 364 N.E.2d 191, 198-99 (Mass.
1977); see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Berry, Self-Incrimination and the
Compulsory Mental Examination: A Proposal, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 919 (1973).
90. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text supra.
91. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (when defendant is granted
use immunity and is later prosecuted, the prosecutor must show that the evidence has been
derived from "a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony"). Be-
cause it can be difficult to establish the independent derivation of evidence, prosecutors may
adopt a practice, employed by federal prosecutors in the context of use immunity, of deliv-
ering sealed files to the court containing evidence already secured against the defendant
before his competency evaluation. See C.H. WHITDREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALY-
SIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONcEPTs 262 (1980). Of course, this practice may prove
so burdensome that in the typical case a busy prosecutor may prefer to forego his opportu-
nity to be present at the evaluation.
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voluntary statements raise fifth amendment questions, the court
should not admit the statements for impeachment purposes.2
E. Bail or Pre-Trial Release
Rule 3.210(b)(3) provides that a motion made for competency
evaluation "shall not otherwise affect the defendant's right to pre-
trial release." This new provision makes it explicit that the mere
filing of a motion for competency examination should not necessar-
ily affect the freedom from custody of either a defendant already
on bail or other pre-trial release, or a defendant seeking such
release.
The rule specifically authorizes the court to order a defendant
released from custody on "a pre-trial release provision . . . to ap-
pear at a designated place for evaluation at a specific time as a
condition of such release provision."9 " Competency evaluation
therefore need not be performed in custody; the defendant may
undergo examination on an outpatient basis at a designated facil-
ity. The rule, however, permits the defendant to be taken into
custody or maintained in custody "[i]f the court determines that
the defendant will not submit to the evaluation provided for herein
or that the defendant is not likely to appear for the scheduled
evaluation.
94
By specifically authorizing pre-trial release and outpatient
evaluation of defendants whose competency is in question, the new
rule should substantially change prior practice, under which courts
rarely permitted release or bail for such defendants.9 5 The prior
automatic no-bail policy was clearly inconsistent with the require-
ment of the United States Supreme Court that restrictive bail be
justified as "relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of
that defendant" at trial." Issuance of an examination order under
the new rule should not, in itself, justify the denial of bail. Pre-
trial release should be appropriate unless the defendant's mental
condition (or some other factor) suggests he will not appear for
evaluation or subsequent proceedings. Moreover, the court may
not deny bail altogether, even if the risk of non-appearance is pre-
92. Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. at 764, 364 N.E.2d at 198; see New Jersey v.
Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
93. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b)(3).
94. Id.
95. Burt & Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. Cm.
L. REV. 66, 88 (1972); Slovenko, supra note 2, at 174.
96. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
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sent except, of course, in a capital case;' 7 even in a capital case, the
Supreme Court of Florida has held that denial of bail may not be
automatic."e
F. The Hearing and the Burden of Proof
After the experts have completed their evaluation of the de-
fendant, they prepare written reports analyzing the factors set
forth in rule 3.211. They then submit the reports to the court, with
copies to the attorneys for the state and the defense."e If the re-
ports are unanimous in their conclusions, the prosecution and de-
fense will frequently stipulate to accept the reports, in which case
a formal hearing is unnecessary. 100 Otherwise, the court will hold a
hearing at which the attorneys have an opportunity to offer evi-
dence and examine witnesses, including the examining experts.101
At the hearing, the court-appointed experts, whether called by the
court or by either party, are "court witnesses . . . and may be ex-
amined as such by either party."10 As a result, counsel may ask
leading questions or 'impeach the court-appointed expert, even if
the party represented by counsel called the expert to testify. 08
The ultimate determination of the defendant's competence is
within the discretion of the trial judge.'0 4 The Supreme Court of
Florida has stressed that the examiner's report "is merely advisory
97. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d
1372 (4th Cir. 1969); Burt & Morris, supra note 95, at 88; Gobert, supra note 6, at 671;
Project, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change-Incompetence
to Stand Trial on Criminal Charges, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. Rp. 613, 620-21 (1978).
98. State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980).
99. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.211.
100. See Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971). Either party, however, is
entitled to insist upon a formal hearing. Id. Moreover, even if both counsel wish to waive
the hearing, due process requires a hearing if the defendant himself wishes to contest the
reports. State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973).
101. FLA. R. CraiM. P. 3.212. Due process protects the right of the defendant at the
competency hearing to confront the witnesses against his interest and to cross-examine
them. See People v. Charette, - A.D.2d -, 431 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (1980).
102. Id.
103. Id., Committee Note.
104. In most jurisdictions the court decides the competency issue, although some per-
mit a jury determination. Slovenko, supra note 2, at 168. Several courts have held the sixth
amendment right to jury trial inapplicable to determinations of competency, United States
v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); Hall v. United
States, 410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969); United States v. Huff, 409
F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1969), even when civil commitment proceedings use a jury. State ex rel.
Matalik v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973). But see Gomez v. Miller, 341 F.
Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afld, 412 U.S. 914 (1973); Gobert, supra note 6, at 673.
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to the court, which itself retains the responsibility of decision." 10 5
Although the court need not follow the recommendations of the
appointed experts, it generally does so. The tendency of judges to
defer to the conclusions of psychiatrists regarding competency, as
well as other issues, is well-documented in the literature.'0 6 This
deference accorded the "expert" is nevertheless problematic, in
view of a variety of factors making psychiatric judgments much
less reliable and less valid than is commonly thought."' The ten-
dency to defer to psychiatric expertise also presents difficulties for
the defense counsel seeking to controvert the psychiatrists' conclu-
sions concerning competence. Defense counsel may, of course, hire
his own expert to evaluate the defendant and, if the defendant is
indigent, may seek such a defense expert by court appointment. 108
Also, either party may introduce additional evidence. 0 9 Defense
counsel may, for example, adduce the testimony of friends and
family members about their observations of the defendant's behav-
ior, mental condition, and trial capabilities.1 0  Moreover, the
defendant himself may testify at the hearing 1"I Counsel should, of
course, stress the argument that the decision to deprive the
defendant of his right to stand trial is not a psychiatric judgment,
but a legal one, which the judge must reach independently."
2
105. Brock v. State, 69 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. 1954) (quoting 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law, §
940, at 239).
106. See, e.g., H. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP? DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL 56 (1979); Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contem-
porary Relevance, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 559, 580 (1972); Rosenberg & McGarry, Compe-
tency for Trial: The Making of an Expert, 128 AM. J. PSYCH. 1092, 1092-95 (1972); Vann &
Morganroth, The Psychiatrist as Judge: A Second Look at the Competence to Stand Trial,
43 U. DET. L.J. 1, 2-3, 9 (1965).
107. See J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (3d ed.
1981); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974).
108. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(a).
109. Id. 3.212.
110. Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68, 71-72 (Fla. 1971), modified, 408 U.S. 938 (1972);
see Butler v. State, 261 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (lay witnesses may testify on
issue of legal insanity); Byrd v. State, 178 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) (same).
111. Any statments made by the defendant at his competency hearing may not later
be used against him at trial on the question of guilt. Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383,
1388 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); People v. Angelillo, - Misc. 2d -, 432 N.Y.S.2d 127, 131 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1980); see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Some courts, however, permit
the use of such statements for impeachment. See People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317
N.E.2d 545 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975). But see New Jersey v. Portash, 440
U.S. 450 (1979).
112. United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 908 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Da-
vis, 365 F.2d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972, 976 (W.D.
Mo. 1964); Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 1971), modified, 408 U.S. 938 (1972);
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There are, of course, circumstances in which the court would
rule against the recommendations of the experts. For example,
such circumstances arise when the reasons the experts give are not
those required by law, when there is overwhelming conflicting evi-
dence, or when the experts themselves disagree. "
Under Florida law, the defendant enters the courtroom with a
presumption of competence.11' When the defendant seeks a finding
of incompetence, the defense bears the burden of persuasion,
which it must carry by a preponderance of the evidence."1 " Al-
though apparently no reported Florida decision addresses the
question of who bears the burden of persuasion when either the
prosecutor or the court seeks the evaluation and the defendant as-
serts that he is competent, the state should carry the burden in
such cases, in view of the presumption in favor of competence. 16
IV. DISPOSITION OF THE INCOMPETENT DEFENDANT
Rule 3.212(a) directs the court to consider the issue of the de-
fendant's competence first. The court should therefore make this
determination before any consideration of the issue of involuntary
hospitalization. "If the court finds the defendant competent to





If the court determines that the defendant is not competent,
"the court shall consider the issue of involuntary hospitalization of
the defendant if examination into that issue has been previously
Butler v. State, 261 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d at 908; In re Lee v. County Court, 27
N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
114. Child v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1963).
115. Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68, 70-71 (Fla. 1971); Brock v. State, 69 So. 2d 344
(Fla. 1954); Flowers v. State, 353 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Contra, United States v.
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States
v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 1976) (prosecution bears burden of showing, by pre-
ponderance of evidence, that defendant is competent). But see People v. Carl, 58 A. D. 2d
1948, 397 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 46 N.Y.2d 806, 386 N.E.2d 828, 413
N.Y.S.2d 916 (1978); Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and
Constitutional Problems, 45 U. Cm. L. RaD. 21, 55-57, 66 (1977) (court should bear burden
of determining competency).
116. See Project, supra note 97, at 624 (the party asserting incompetency should bear
burden of proof by preponderance of evidence). Contra, State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316
(Iowa 1978) (burden of proof upon defendant, regardless of who raises the issue).
117. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.212(a). A verbal finding on the record is sufficient; the court
need not make a written order. Alexander v. State, 380 So. 2d 1188, 1190-91 (Fla. 5th DCA
1980).
[Vol. 35:31
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
ordered." 118 Presumably, although rule 3.212 does not so provide, if
the court has not previously ordered inquiry into that issue but
finds from the evidence before it that the defendant may meet the
involuntary commitment standards of the Baker Act or Retarda-
tion Act, the court may then order the experts to consider the in-
voluntary commitment issue in accordance with the factors set
forth in rule 3.211(d)(1).
A. Incompetent Defendant Not Meeting Criteria for
Involuntary Commitment
If the court decides that the defendant, although incompetent
to stand trial, does not meet the criteria for involuntary commit-
ment, it may release him "on appropriate release conditions for a
period not to exceed one year."11 ' The court may order outpatient
treatment at a local facility and periodic evaluation to determine
whether the defendant has regained his competence.2 0 If the eval-
uation indicates that the defendant may have become competent,
the court should hold a hearing. If it then finds the defendant com-
petent, it must proceed to trial.1" If the defendant fails to comply
with the conditions of release, or if his condition deteriorates and
requires inpatient care, the court may hold a hearing and modify
the conditions of release or commit the defendant to the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services for treatment. "
B. Incompetent Defendant Meeting Criteria for Involuntary
Commitment
If the court decides that a defendant found incompetent meets
the criteria for involuntary commitment, rule 3.212(b)(1) requires
it to transfer the defendant to a treatment facility as defined in the
Baker Act, or to order that he receive "outpatient treatment at any
other appropriate facility or service on an involuntary basis." This
section further provides that "[s]uch involuntary hospitalization or
treatment shall be subject to all provisions of Florida Statutes not
in conflict herewith. "




122. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-75, § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 925.27(2)).
123. FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.212(b)(1). See also 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-75, § 2 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 925.28) (expressing the intent of the legislature that treatment for such
involuntarily-hospitalized defendants be provided "in such a manner as to insure the full
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1. COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES TO COMMITMENT
The statutes and rules now governing competence to stand
trial in Florida demonstrate a broad acceptance of the "least re-
strictive alternative" principle. 124 For example, rule 3.211(b)(1)(v)
requires the examining expert to consider alternatives other than
hospitalization that might be less restrictive on the defendant's lib-
erty. Rule 3.212(b)(1) provides for outpatient treatment, while
both rule 3.212(c) and section 925.27 of the Florida Statutes au-
thorize conditional release. Moreover, rule 3.212(b)(1) and section
925.28 of the Florida Statutes incorporate by reference all noncon-
flicting provisions contained in the Baker Act or Retardation
Act-statutes that themselves strongly endorse the principle.12
In the past, the court routinely would commit an incompetent
defendant to the forensic wards of the South Florida State Hospi-
tal at Pembroke Pines, the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoo-
chee, or the North Florida Treatment and Evaluation Center in
Gainesville. Such a practice of automatic hospitalization for an in-
competent defendant was questionable as a matter of policy and
may also have violated the constitutional "least restrictive alterna-
protection of the rights of said patients" as set forth in the Baker Act).
124. See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MIC. L. REV. 1108 (1972); Ashe v. Robinson,
450 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Davis v.
Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn.
1974).
125. Both the Baker Act and the Retardation Act require the placement of an invol-
untarily committed individual in the least restrictive environment. A condition of involun-
tary commitment for a mentally retarded person is that such placement be "the least re-
strictive and most appropriate alternative to meet his needs." FLA. STAT. § 393.11(1)(b)
(Supp. 1980). See also FLA. STAT. § 393.065(2) (1979), requiring the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services to "prescribe and provide an appropriate individual habilitation
plan for each client. . . . Each plan shall include the most cost-beneficial, least restrictive
environment for accomplishment of the objectives for client progress .... The declaration
of intent of the Retardation Act (id. § 393.062) states that
greatest priority shall be given to the development and implementation of com-
munity-based residential placements, services and treatment programs for the
retarded and other developmentally disabled individuals . . . to achieve their
greatest potential for independent and productive living, which will enable them
to live in their own homes or in facilities located in their own communities, and
which will permit clients to be diverted or removed from unnecessary institu-
tional placements.
The Baker Act similarly adopts the principle of the least restrictive alternative. Id. §
394.453, entitled "Legislative Intent," declares that "the least restrictive means of interven-
tion be employed based on the individual needs of each patient within the scope of available
services." Id. § 394.459(2)(b) (Supp. 1980) provides that "[iut is further the policy of the
state that the least restrictive available treatment be utilized based on the individual needs
and best interests of the patient."
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tive" doctrine. 126 Defense counsel should use these new provisions
to seek community alternatives to hospitalization for incompetent
clients. Generally, the state hospital forensic wards are grossly
overcrowded and underfunded, and provide little treatment other
than psychotropic medication. As a result, it is generally in the
best interest of incompetent defendants to avoid hospitalization
and receive outpatient treatment in the community. Defense coun-
sel should use the assistance of social workers to locate less restric-
tive community placements and treatments. The availability of
these facilities provides defense counsel a basis for insisting that
the court not order hospitalization when the defendant's condition
does not require it.
2. HOSPITALIZATION AND TREATMENT
If the court commits the defendant to a hospital or retardation
facility, rule 3.212(b)(2) requires the order of commitment to con-
tain the following:
(i) Findings of fact relating to the issues of competency and in-
voluntary hospitalization, addressing the factors set forth in
Rule 3.211 above where applicable;
(ii) Copies of the reports of the experts filed with the court pur-
suant to the order of examination;
(iii) Any other psychiatric, psychological or social work reports
submitted to the court relative to the mental state of the
defendant;
(iv) The charging instrument and also supporting affidavits or
other documents used in determination of probable cause.127
These provisions attempt to give greater assistance to the staff of
the relevant treatment facility in making their initial evaluation
and in instituting appropriate treatment more expeditiously.
Rule 3.212(b)(3), as well as complementary section 924.23(1)
of the Florida Statutes, provides that "[t]he treatment facility
shall admit the defendant for hospitalization and treatment and
may retain and treat the defendant."1 28 Such treatment, as well as
126. A. STONE, supra note 9, at 212; D. WEXLER, supra note 6, at 40-41; Janis, supra
note 68, at 738; see United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1963). A federal district
court recently found that Connecticut's statutory procedure governing incompetence to
stand trial violated due process by failing to require a determination that commitment is
the least restrictive alternative to effect restoration to competency. DeAngelas v. Plaut, No.
N-77-147 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 1980), 5 MzrrAL DisAiLrrv L. REP. 9, 10 (1981).
127. FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.212(b)(2).
128. Id. 3.212(b)(3).
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that rendered in a community-based program, seeks to restore the
defendant to sufficient competence to stand trial, not necessarily to
cure him of his mental illness. 129 Because the purpose of commit-
ting the incompetent defendant is to restore him to capacity to
stand trial,180 such commitment must entail treatment that makes
it substantially probable "that he will attain that capacity in the
foreseeable future.""' If treatment that the state hospital or retar-
dation facility affords is inadequate to achieve this goal expedi-
tiously, such hospitalization is subject to attack as a violation of
the defendant's constitutional right to treatment, 2 as well as his
fourteenth amendment right to liberty.3 In view of the current
condition of the state hospital forensic wards and retardation facil-
ities, right-to-treatment suits on behalf of incompetent defendants
committed therein would likely result in court-ordered
improvements.1 3
4
C. Continuing Incompetence or Need for Commitment
1. INITIATING REVIEW
If the administrator of the facility determines on the basis of
the defendant's response to treatment that he has become compe-
129. Winick, supra note 8, at 770.
130. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Garrett v. State, 390 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1980), review denied, No. 60,065 (Fla. Apr. 10, 1981).
131. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.at 738.
132. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974). By placing substantive due process limits
on the state's power to commit the incompetent defendant, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972), gives rise to a right to treatment for defendants committed on this basis. See
Gobert, supra note 6, at 684-85; Project, supra note 97, at 625. In fact, the Supreme Court
in Jackson expressed "substantial doubts about whether the rationale of pre-trial commit-
ment-that care or treatment will aid the accused in attaining competency-is empirically
valid given the state of most of our mental institutions." 406 U.S. at 735. The defendant
also has a statutory right to treatment under FLA. STAT. § 394.459(2) & (4) (1979 & Supp.
1980). Provisions of the Baker Act are incorporated by reference in FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.212(b)(1) and in FLA. STAT. § 916.18 (Supp. 1980). Section 394.459(2)(a) (Supp. 1980) pro-
vides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services "shall not deny treatment
for mental illness to any person." FLA. STAT. § 394.459(4)(a) (Supp. 1980) provides that
Each patient in a facility shall receive treatment suited to his needs, which shall
be administered skillfully, safely, and humanely with full respect for his dignity
and personal integrity. Each patient shall receive such medical, vocational, so-
cial, educational, and rehabilitative services as his condition requires to bring
about an early return to his community.
133. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
134. See, e.g., State v. Twyman, No. 75-525 CFA (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., March 27, 1980)
(stipulation of settlement on conditions, staffing patterns, and treatment of patients con-
fined in the forensic wards of South Florida State Hospital).
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tent to stand trial or no longer meets the criteria for involuntary
commitment, rule 3.212(b)(3) requires the administrator to notify
the court by sending it a report, with copies to all parties. The
report must consider the factors dealing with competence and the
need for involuntary commitment set forth in rule 3.211(a) and
(b).'" Moreover, if counsel for the defendant has reasonable
grounds to believe that the defendant has regained his competence
to stand trial or no longer meets the criteria for involuntary com-
mitment, counsel may move the court for a hearing on that is-
sue.136 The motion must certif that counsel made it in good faith
and on reasonable grounds, and without invading the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, the motion must recite the specific observations of
and conversations with the defendant that form the basis for the
motion.1 87 If the court concludes, upon consideration of such a mo-
tion filed by counsel for the defendant, that reasonable grounds
exist to believe that the defendant may have regained competence
or no longer meets the criteria for involuntary commitment, the
court may order the administrator of the facility to submit a report
to the court on these issues, with copies to all parties, "and shall
order a hearing to be held on those issues."
138
2. HEARING
Rule 3.212(b)(4) requires the court to hold the hearing within
thirty days of the receipt of any report on competence or need for
hospitalization from the administrator of the facility, whether pro-
vided under rule 3.212(b)(3) or in response to the court's order. If,
following the hearing, the court finds the defendant competent to
stand trial, "it shall enter its order so finding and shall proceed
with the trial."13 9 The court cannot adjudicate a change in the de-
fendant's status from incompetent to competent without a hear-
ing.1 40 If the court determines that the defendant remains incom-
petent and still meets the criteria for involuntary commitment, it
must order continued hospitalization or treatment.14 1 If the court
determines that the defendant remains incompetent but no longer
135. See notes 123-54 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of these factors.




140. Alexander v. State, 380 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Parks v. State,
290 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
141. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.212(b)(4).
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Rule 3.212(c) authorizes conditional release of an incompetent
defendant who no longer meets the criteria for involuntary
commitment:
The defendant may be released on appropriate release condi-
tions for a period not to exceed one year. The court may order
that the defendant receive outpatient treatment at an appropri-
ate local facility and that the defendant report for further evalu-
ation at specified times during such release period as conditions
of release. A report shall be filed with the court after each such
evaluation by the persons appointed by the court to make such
evaluations, with copies to all parties.1""
Rule 3.219 and section 925.27 of the Florida Statutes also au-
thorize such conditional release, and further provide that if the ad-
ministrator of the facility deems outpatient treatment appropriate
for the defendant, the administrator may file with the court a writ-
ten plan for the defendant's release, with copies to all parties. Such
a plan, which the defendant may also submit, must include: "(1)
Special provisions for residential care and/or adequate supervision
of the defendant; (2) Provisions for outpatient mental health ser-
vices; (3) If appropriate, recommendations for auxiliary services
such as vocational training, educational services, or special medical
care.
,, 14 4
The statute further requires the court to specify the condi-
tions of release based upon the release plan, and to direct that the
appropriate agency submit periodic reports to the court on the de-
fendant's compliance with these conditions and progress in treat-
ment."1' If the defendant fails to comply with the conditions of re-
lease, or if his condition deteriorates and requires inpatient care,
the court may, following a hearing, order the defendant returned to
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for further
treatment. '4 Following a hearing the court may, when appropriate,
modify the release conditions.
47
142. FLA. R. Cim. P. 3.212(c).
143. Id.
144. Id. 3.219.
145. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-75, § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 916.17(1)).
146. Id. (to be codified at § 925.27(2)).
147. Id.
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4. PERIODIC REVIEW
Even if no one initiates the review procedure described
above,14 8 the administrator must nonetheless file with the court a
report discussing both the defendant's competence and the ques-
tion of whether the defendant still meets the criteria for involun-
tary commitment. 1 9 The administrator must do this no later than
six months from the date of the defendant's admission to the facil-
ity.150 His report must consider the factors set forth in rule
3.211(a) and (b).1 51 Within thirty days of the receipt of the report,
the court must hold a hearing on the issues.15 2 Again, if at this
hearing the court determines that the defendant is competent, it
must proceed with the trial; if it determines that the defendant
remains incompetent and still meets the criteria for involuntary
commitment, it must order continued hospitalization or treatment
for a period not to exceed one year; if it determines that the
defendant remains incompetent but no longer meets the criteria
for involuntary commitment, it may order conditional release.15
When the facility retains the defendant, the administrator and
the court must repeat the same review procedure before the expi-
ration of each additional one-year period of extended hospitaliza-
tion, unless within that period the defendant's counsel files a mo-
tion or the administrator files a report stating that the defendant
no longer meets the criteria for involuntary commitment.'"
D. Disposition of the Defendant Who Remains Incompetent
If the defendant remains incompetent for five years after a de-
termination of incompetence in the case of a defendant charged
with a felony, or for one year in the case of a defendant charged
with a misdemeanor, rule 3.213(a) requires that the court conduct
a hearing. If the court determines that the defendant remains in-
competent and there is no substantial probability that he will be-
come competent in the foreseeable future, the court must dismiss
the charges against the defendant. In such a case, the court must
also determine whether the defendant meets or continues to meet
148. See text accompanying notes 139-47 supra.
149. FLA. R. CRIm. P. 3.212(b)(3).
150. Id.
151. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-75, § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 916.13(1)); see notes
123-54 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of these factors.
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the criteria for involuntary commitment;155 if not, the court must
order the defendant released from custody. 158 If, on the other
hand, the defendant still meets those criteria, the court must ei-
ther commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services for involuntary hospitalization or placement
solely under the provisions of the Baker Act or the Retardation
Act, or order that he receive outpatient treatment at any other fa-
cility, subject to the provisions of those statutes.15 7 In any such
order of commitment, the court must require the administrator of
the facility to notify the state attorney no less than thirty days
before any anticipated date of release of the defendant. 58
The rule does not address the case of a defendant who remains
incompetent following the specified period but continues to pre-
sent a substantial probability of restoration to competence in the
foreseeable future. In the absence of an express provision, the more
general provisions of rule 3.212 would appear to apply. A defend-
ant still meeting the criteria for involuntary commitment must an-
nually undergo review and a hearing on his condition. If he does
not meet those criteria, the court will grant a conditional release
under rule 3.212(c), with periodic reevaluation. Although theoreti-
cally this process could continue indefinitely, it is unlikely that a
defendant who has remained incompetent for a lengthy period
would also continue to present a substantial probability of restora-
tion to competence in the foreseeable future. With the passage of
time, it becomes more and more difficult to justify assertions that
the defendant will regain capacity in the foreseeable future. Ulti-
mately, application of rule 3.213 will become appropriate and re-
quire dismissal of charges. Moreover, such repeated findings by the
court of a substantial probability of regaining capacity in the fore-
seeable future may, if sufficient time has passed and if the defend-
ant suffers prejudice as a result, support a claim that these rulings
and the attendant delay have violated the defendant's right to due
155. Id. 3.213(a)-(b). The District Court of Appeal, Third District, considering a case
in which the critical events occurred before the recent revision of the rule, ordered a dismis-
sal of charges after the defendant had been held for a six-year period without restoration to
competency or determination of the likelihood of eventual ability to stand trial. Garrett v.
State, 390 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, No. 60,065 (Fla. Apr. 10, 1981). The
court acted on due process grounds, finding that the lengthy commitment violated the "rea-
sonable period" requirement of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). See notes 217-
22 and accompanying text infra.
156. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.213(a).
157. Id. 3.213(b).
158. Id. This requirement of notification would provide the state attorney an opportu-
nity to contest release, under appropriate circumstances.
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process or a speedy trial.1 9
If, under rule 3.213, the court has dismissed the charges
against the defendant and subsequently declares him competent to
stand trial, the prosecutor may refile charges against him. Rule
3.214(a) and section 925.24 provide that such prior dismissal "shall
not constitute former jeopardy." Moreover, section 925.24 of the
Florida Statutes provides that "[tihe statute of limitations shall
not be applicable to criminal charges dismissed because of the in-
competency of the defendant to stand trial." Such a revival of
charges, of course, could raise a possible speedy trial defense,16
and, in extreme cases, due process problems."'1
V. PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION AND COMPETENCE
A. Competence Dependent on Medication
Psychotropic medication is perhaps the most widely used and
most effective treatment technique for psychiatric conditions that
result in incompetence to stand trial. 1 2 As a result, many defend-
ants adjudicated incompetent can regain competence by the use of
these drugs.163 Many, however, will require continued medication
to maintain their competence. Under rule 3.214(c) and section
925.22(2) of the Florida Statutes, a defendant whose competence
depends on use of these drugs "shall not automatically be deemed
incompetent to stand trial simply because his satisfactory mental
functioning is dependent on such medication."" 4 Virtually all ap-
pellate courts that have considered the issue have taken this ap-
proach. " The Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues of the Pres-
ident's Commission on Mental Health,"66 as well as other
commentators,1 67 also has recommended this approach. Of course,
159. See notes 183-222 and accompanying text infra.
160. See notes 183-216 and accompanying text infra.
161. See notes 217-22 and accompanying text infra.
162. MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 2, at 901; HOLLISTER, Psychotropic Drugs and
Court Competence in LAW PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 1 (L. Ir-
vine & T. Brelje eds. 1972); Winick, supra note 8, at 769-77.
163. Winick, supra note 8, at 769-77.
164. FLA. STAT. § 916.12(2) (Supp. 1980).
165. E.g., United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847
(1979); People v. Dalfonso, 24 Ill. App. 3d 748, 321 N.E.2d 379 (1974); State v. Hampton,
253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969).
166. TASK PANEL, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, TASK PANEL REPORT:
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 1459-60 (Feb. 15, 1978).
167. See, e.g., MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 2; S. HALLECK, supra note 26, at 239-
40; HOLLISTER, supra note 162; Winick, supra note 8.
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if the medication does not succeed in restoring the defendant to
competence, or if its side effects materially interfere with his abil-
ity to understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist in his
defense, then the court should not deem him competent.'6 s
Rule 3.214(c)(2) provides that if a defendant proceeds to trial
under psychotropic medication, upon motion of his counsel, "the
jury shall, at the beginning of the trial, and in the charge to the
jury, be given explanatory instructions regarding such medica-
tion." 69 Such an instruction would be particularly appropriate in
the case of a defendant raising an insanity defense. The jury, ob-
serving the defendant in an artificially calm state-with the medi-
cation keeping the bizarre symptoms of his mental illness in
check-may otherwise find it difficult to believe he was mentally ill
at the time of the crime.170
B. Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication
Florida case law does not address the issue whether a defend-
ant may refuse psychotropic medication that a psychiatrist be-
lieves is necessary to maintain the defendant's competence. A
growing body of recent case law in other jurisdictions recognizes a
constitutional right of competent mental patients to refuse mental
health treatment, including psychotropic medication. 17  The Baker
Act broadly provides that patients who are competent to consent
168. Winick, supra note 8, at 815; e.g., Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F. Supp. 898
(M.D. Fla. 1978).
169. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.214(c)(2).
170. See State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976); In re Pray, 133
Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975); State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960).
171. E.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Mass.
1979), a/f'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J.
1978). See generally R. SCHWITZGEBEL, LEGAL AsPEcTs OF THE ENFORCED TREATMENT OF OF-
FENDERS (DHEW Pub. No. 79-831, 1979); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461 (1977); Winick, Legal Limita-
tions on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REV. 331 (1981). The right to
refuse treatment
can be derived from a variety of constitutional sources: a First Amendment right
to be free of interference with mental processes, the right to privacy protected
by Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process,
the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion in the case of reli-
gious-based refusals, and the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment
protected by the Eighth Amendment.
Winick, supra note 8, at 811-12.
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have the right to refuse treatment;1 7 2 for patients not competent to
consent, the Act permits treatment only after a hearing officer has
found the patient incompetent and has appointed a "guardian ad-
vocate" to act on the patient's behalf in consenting to treatment.1 7 8
These constitutional and statutory rights to refuse treatment
seem generally applicable to the defendant who has regained his
capacity and who desires to discontinue psychotropic medica-
tion." " Indeed, the rights may even apply to the defendant found
incompetent to stand trial who has not yet regained trial capacity,
in view of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.214(b), which
states that an adjudication of incompetence to stand trial "shall
not operate as an adjudication of incompetency to consent to med-
ical treatment or for any other purpose unless such other adjudica-
tion is specifically set forth in the order." As a result, in the court
order adjudicating a defendant incompetent to stand trial; the
judge may include a finding that the defendant is also incompetent
to consent to treatment.17 5 Most defendants who are incompetent
to stand trial will also be incompetent to consent to treatment; but
some who lack trial capacity under the Dusky standard will none-
theless retain capacity to participate in treatment decisions. An
automatic finding of incompetence to consent therefore seems in-
appropriate; rather, due process will require that the court base its
finding on an adequate record made at a hearing at which the de-
fendant's counsel has had an opportunity to assert the competency
of his client to consent to treatment.
1 7
Even if a judicial determination of incompetency to consent to.
treatment renders inapplicable the statutory right to refuse, "7 de-
fendants may assert a constitutional right to resist medication,
172. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) (Supp. 1980).
173. Id. A limited exception exists for emergency treatment, which may be adminis-
tered "in the least restrictive manner" upon written order of a mental health professional
who determines that such treatment "is necessary for the safety of the patient or others."
Id.
174. Winick, supra note 8, at 811.
175. The Baker Act provisions are incorporated by reference in FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.212(b)(1) and in 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-75, § 2 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 916.18). See
note 132 supra.
176. Cf. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971)
(procedural due process violated by subjecting mental patient involuntarily committed in
civil proceedings to involuntary psychotropic medication, absent a hearing on the patient's
competence to consent).
177. The statutory right to refuse seems unimpaired for the rare defendant who is
competent to consent to treatment, although incompetent to stand trial. See note 173 and
accompanying text supra.
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under a first amendment right to be free from interference with
mental processes,"17 and the due process right to bodily privacy.
179
Although these are fundamental constitutional rights, the courts
will likely find them outweighed by the state's interest in restoring
the defendant to competence or in retaining him in a competent
condition. The state's interest in bringing to trial defendants ac-
cused in good faith and on probable cause of violating its laws lies
at the very core of its police power, and would therefore probably
satisfy the requirement of a compelling state interest.180
By invoking the least restrictive alternative principle, however,
the defendant may successfully challenge the forced administration
of drugs on the basis that the facility should try alternative treat-
ment methods before using such intrusive techniques as psycho-
tropic medication.181 Furthermore, a defendant restored to compe-
tence by medication could assert a right to discontinue that
medication and waive in advance his due process objection to any
incompetence at trial induced by that discontinuation.182
VI. SPEEDY TRIAL AND DuE PROCESS LIMITS ON INCOMPETENCY
COMMITMENT
A. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, the state
must bring every defendant to trial, without demand, within
178. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
179. See Davis v. Hubbard, 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1980); Rogers v.
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980); Rennie
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980).
180. Winick, supra note 8, at 812-13.
181. Id. at 813; Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1980); Romeo v.
Youngberg, 5 MENTAL DisAnurrv L. REP. 22, 24 (3d Cir. Nov. 24, 1980); Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131, 1146 (D.N.J. 1978) (lithium and antidepressant medication less intrusive
than antipsychotic medication); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 753 n.15 (D.C. 1979). Applying
the "least restrictive alternative" principle to choices of therapy involves difficult empirical
questions about the efficacy of the various treatment techniques, as well as substantial value
judgments about the ranking of techniques according to their respective intrusions on con-
stitutional rights. For an attempt to rank the various therapies on a continuum of intrusive-
ness, see Winick, supra note 171. Of course, in choosing the least restrictive alternative, the
courts should consider as sufficient to satisfy the state's compelling interest only those ther-
apies thought likely to restore the defendant's competency. Winick, supra note 8, at 813
n.248. Thus, psychotherapy and behavior modification techniques, which are considerably
less effective than medication in treating the typical psychiatric disorders causing trial inca-
pacity, will generally not be required even though one may consider them less restrictive
than most psychotropic drugs.
182. State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978); Winick, supra note 8, at 814.
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ninety days if the crime charged is a misdemeanor, or 180 days if
the crime charged is a felony.188 The rule provides, however, that
these time periods "may at any time be waived or extended by
order of the court. . . [for] a period of reasonable and necessary
delay resulting from proceedings . . . to determine the mental
competency or physical ability of the defendant to stand trial." '
Prior law exhibited some confusion about whether the speedy trial
time periods were waived (in which case the time periods are inap-
plicable) or extended (in which case the time periods are applica-
ble but tolled) for such periods of evaluation or treatment relating
to competence to stand trial.185 When the court orders a compe-
tency evaluation, to avoid possible waiver of the rule, defense
counsel should seek a specific order tolling the speedy trial period
for a reasonable and necessary period of evaluation, after which
the time periods will continue to run. 8 Rule 3.214(d) partially re-
solves this confusion by providing that the speedy trial periods
contained in rule 3.191 shall not apply to a defendant adjudged
incompetent to stand trial until "the date the defendant is again
adjudged competent to stand trial or, in the case of a defendant
whose charges have been dismissed without prejudice, the date the
charges are again filed.
187
B. Constitutional Speedy Trial
Even when Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 is inap-
plicable, a lengthy period of delay in bringing an incompetent de-
fendant to trial may violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial
under the United States and Florida Constitutions.8 " In the lead-
ing speedy trial decision, Barker v. Wingo,"' the Supreme Court
adopted a balancing test for determining violation of the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial, which applies to the states
under the fourteenth amendment. The Court identified four fac-
183. FLA. R. CriM. P. 3.191(a)(1).
184. Id. 3.191(d)(2)(iv).
185. Compare Miller v. State, 332 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976); State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen,
253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971); Flicker v. State, 352 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Davis v.
State, 302 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), and Chester v. State, 298 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA
1974) with Yetter, The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1977 Amendments, 5 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 241, 285-87 (1977).
186. See Yetter, supra note 185, at 285.
187. FLA. R. CriM. P. 3.214(d).
188. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Chester v. State, 298 So. 2d 529 (Fla.
3d DCA 1974).
189. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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tors for consideration on a case-by-case basis: the length of the de-
lay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of his right;
and the prejudice to the defendant. Florida courts have recognized
and applied the Barker factors in determining whether a delay vio-
lates the Florida constitutional speedy trial protections.'90
The first factor cited by the Barker Court requires a sufficient
period of delay to trigger further inquiry. A period in excess of one
year certainly appears sufficient. Once such a period of delay has
passed, the courts, under the second Barker factor, must scrutinize
the reason for the delay. In this regard, the Barker Court noted
that "[a] deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper
the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts
should be weighted less heavily ... "191 A "valid reason, such as a
missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay."' 2 Tra-
ditionally, a reasonable period of evaluation and treatment for
competence to stand trial provides a valid reason excusing delay. "'
The courts, however, should not excuse unreasonable periods of
delay. A competency evaluation can reasonably be performed
within several days or weeks.'" The court should charge against
the state any delay that exceeds the twenty-day period specified in
rule 3.210(b) for evaluation and scheduling the hearing. Once
treatment has restored the defendant's competency, the facility
should expeditiously return him to court for a competency deter-
mination. If the facility administrator fails to file the reports re-
quired under rule 3.212(b), or if the court fails to hold hearings on
these reports within thirty days of their receipt, as required by rule
3.212(b)(4),'" the resulting periods of delay should also count
against the state.
Florida courts have recognized that the state is primarily re-
sponsible for providing a defendant with a speedy trial, and that
although a defendant's request for a competency evaluation pro-
190. See, e.g., Chester v. State, 298 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
191. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531.
192. Id.; see Winick, supra note 8, at 803-04.
193. See United States v. Cartano, 420 F.2d 362 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1054
(1970); Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964); Germany v. Hudspeth, 209
F.2d 15 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 946 (1954); United States v. Lancaster, 408 F.
Supp. 225 (D.D.C. 1976); Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4) (1976); A.B.A.
STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRI § 23(a) (approved draft, 1968).
194. See Bluestone & Melella, A Study of Criminal Defendants Referred for Compe-
tency to Stand Trial in New York, 7 BuLL. Am. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 166, 176 (1979); Burt &
Morris, supra note 95, at 88; Yetter, supra note 185, at 285.
195. FLA. R. CaM. P. 3.212(b)(4).
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longs the proceedings, it does not alleviate the state's continuing
responsibility to try the defendant speedily. 1' The Fifth Circuit
has held that the prosecution has a "constitutionally imposed duty
to take affirmative action to secure [the defendant's] return for
trial. 19 7 The state has "the special obligation. . . to press the case
to trial as the period of unavoidable delay mounts."19 8 Moreover,
the prosecution "may not justify a delay merely by citing the de-
fendant's incompetence." ' " "The Government must carefully and
vigilantly protect the interests of both the incompetent individual
and society." 200 As the period of hospitalization for incompetence
lengthens, the prosecutor's burden increases.01
The third Barker factor is the defendant's assertion of his
right to a speedy trial. Although nonassertion of the right does not
constitute waiver, the Court recognized that failure to assert the
right "will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was
denied a speedy trial.''
202
The final factor cited in Barker is prejudice to the defen-
dant.208 The Court, however, "expressly rejected the notion that an
affirmative demonstration of prejudice [is] necessary to prove a de-
nial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial."''2 4 "[W]here the
defendant has established a prima facie case of denial of the
speedy trial right, the burden is upon the State to show that the
defendant has not been prejudiced by the delay."' 0'° "[P]rejqdice is
immaterial where consideration of the other three factors-length
of delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and reasons for the de-
lay-coalesce in the defendant's favor . . .,,12
Barker identified three types of prejudice against which the
right to a speedy trial guards: oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
anxiety and concern of the accused; and the possibility that delay
will impair the defense. 0 7 Clearly, any periods of unnecessary hos-
pitalization constitute oppressive pre-trial detention within the
196. McGraw v. State, 330 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. 1st DCA), overruled on other grounds,
332 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1976).
197. Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 705 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
198. United States v. Brown, 520 F.2d 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
199. United States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d 585, 588 (9th Cir. 1975).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 589.
202. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
203. Id. at 532-33.
204. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973).
205. Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
206. Id.; Hoskins v. Wainwright, 485 F.2d 1186, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1973).
207. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972).
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meaning of Barker. The "hospitals" in Florida for incompetent de-
fendants, similar to maximum security facilities for the criminally
insane in other states, are "typically the worst institutions in the
state." 08 They are little more than grim storehouses in which
treatment, if any, is grossly inadequate.20 9 They frequently provide
such poor care, restrictive custody, deprivations, hardships, and in-
dignities that many inmates would prefer incarceration in a
prison.2 10
Moreover, periods of unnecessary hospitalization certainly
provoke considerable anxiety and concern. The incompetent
defendant's concern over the outcome of pending charges against
him is anti-therapeutic and poses a potentially overwhelming ob-
stacle to the patient's improvement.2 11 Several cases have acknowl-
edged that mental conditions developed during the pendency of
prolonged confinement awaiting trial, even when the state did
nothing to cause such conditions, may violate the sixth amendment
right to speedy trial. 2
Although the final kind of prejudice mentioned in
Barker-the possibility of impairment of the defense-is usually
the most serious, the defendant need not show such prejudice in
order to demonstrate a violation of the speedy trial right. s
Lengthy incompetency commitment that hospitalizes the defend-
ant fat from family, friends, or counsel, however, may impair his
ability to defend, hindering the gathering of evidence and the lo-
cating and interviewing of witnesses.2" The passage of time espe-
cially hampers a defense of insanity, often appropriate for the
mentally ill defendant adjudicated incompetent, by making diffi-
cult the proof of defendant's mental state at the time of the
crime.'10 As a result of such factors, some courts have granted dis-
missals for violation of the right to speedy trial in cases involving
208. A. SToNz, supra note 9, at 209.
209. A. BROOKS, LAw, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 397-99 (1974); A.
MATTHEWS, JR., supra note 26, at 134; Note, supra note 11, at 524.
210. See United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969); S.
BRAm.I & R. ROCK, supra note 3, at 407; H. STEADMAN, supra note 106, at 8-9.
211. MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 2, at 905.
212. E.g., United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1976); United States ex
rel. Stukes v. Shovlin, 464 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (3d Cir. 1972).
213. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1973).
214. Winick, supra note 8, at 804.
215. United States v. Morgan, 567 F.2d 479, 497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v.
Geelan, 520 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1975); Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 22-24
(D.C. Cir. 1957); Winick, supra note 8, at 804.
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incompetent defendants confined for lengthy periods21 6
C. Due Process
In a recent case involving more than six years of oppressive
pre-trial delay during which an incompetent defendant underwent
repeated periods of remission and relapse, the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, avoided the speedy trial question, but or-
dered a dismissal of charges on due process grounds. 17 Jackson v.
Indiana2'8 had previously recognized that dismissal of charges
against an incompetent accused may rest not only on speedy trial
grounds, but also on "the denial of due process inherent in holding
pending criminal charges indefinitely over the head of one who will
never have a chance to prove his innocence. 2 19 In Garrett v.
State,2 0 the Third District cited Jackson's requirement that an
incompetent defendant "cannot be held more than the reasonable
period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substan-
tial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future,' 2 21 and found that the defendant's lengthy commitment
without restoration to competency or determination of the likeli-
hood of his eventual ability to stand trial violated this "reasonable
period" requirement. The court reversed the defendant's convic-
tion and ordered his discharge unless the state elected to initiate
civil commitment proceedings. 222 Garrett thus recognizes due pro-
cess limitations on the duration of the incompetency commitment,
as well as the possibility that due process, in extreme cases, may
justify dismissal of charges apart from speedy trial considerations.
216. Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States v. Pardue,
354 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Conn. 1973); see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972); United
States ex rel. von Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States
v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969); People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281,
263 N.E.2d 109 (1970).
217. Garrett v. State, 390 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, No. 60,065
(Fla. Apr. 10, 1981).
218. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
219. Id. at 739. In another context-pre-accusation delay not covered by the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial, United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)-the Court
has reiterated that due process may serve as a separate constitutional limitation on oppres-
sive and prejudicial delay. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (lengthy pre-
indictment delay may violate "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of
our civil and political institutions ... [and] define the community's sense of fair play and
decency").
220. 390 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, No. 60,065 (Fla. Apr. 10, 1981).
221. Id. at 97 (citing Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738).
222. Id.
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VII. RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY AFTER A FINDING
OF INCOMPETENCE
When a court declares a criminal defendant incompetent to
stand trial, the state may not try him and must suspend the crimi-
nal proceedings against him.2 8 Nonetheless, counsel has a continu-
ing responsibility to protect his client's rights.2 2 In Jackson v. In-
diana,22 the Supreme Court recognized counsel's continuing
responsibility and refused to read previous decisions "to preclude
the states from allowing, at a minimum, an incompetent defendant
to raise certain defenses such as insufficiency of the indictment, or
make certain pre-trial motions through counsel." '226 Counsel for an
incompetent defendant should therefore make all motions on his
client's behalf that are susceptible of determination without his cli-
ent's personal participation and presence. 2 7 Whenever possible,
counsel should raise all purely legal issues that the court may con-
sider on pre-trial motion, such as sufficiency of the indictment or
information, the constitutionality of the statute under which the
state charged the defendant, and challenges to the composition of
the grand jury.2 Moreover, a court may entertain and resolve mo-
tions to suppress evidence, to controvert a search warrant, or to
challenge identification testimony without the defendant's per-
sonal participation. Such motions may result in the dismissal of
charges against the defendant, which would deprive the state of its
basis for hospitalizing him or treating him in an outpatient facility,
and require that the state either release the defendant from treat-
ment or civilly commit him. 2'
In Florida, as throughout the United States, ethical considera-
tions obligate an attorney to exert his best efforts on his client's
behalf and to represent those interests zealously.2 80 Moreover, "any
mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable
of making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts addi-
tional responsibility upon his lawyer."'23 ' An attorney representing
223. Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 1971), modified, 408 U.S. 938 (1972).
224. See FLA. BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-31; ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-31.
225. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
226. Id. at 741.
227, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3) (1962).
228. See Foote, supra note 2, at 841.
229. See Janis, supra note 68, at 731.
230. See FLA. BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, Canon 7; ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7.
231. See FLA. BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-12; ABA CODE OF PRO-
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an incompetent defendant should therefore exercise special care to
make all motions on behalf of his client on which the court can
rule notwithstanding his client's incapacity.123
VIII. COMPETENCE TO PARTICIPATE IN OTHER ASPECTS OF
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Even if a defendant is competent to stand trial, the issue of
his competence to participate at other stages of the criminal pro-
ceeding may arise. Florida has long recognized that "if at any time
while criminal proceedings are pending against a person accused of
crime, whether before or during or after the trial, the trial court
...has facts brought to its attention which raise a doubt of the
sanity of the defendant, the question should be settled before fur-
ther steps are taken."23 Thus, if a reasonable doubt arises about a
defendant's competence, the court must hold a hearing on the is-
sue before accepting a plea of guilty 34 or nolo contendere. 35 Al-
though Florida cases do not discuss whether courts should apply a
different standard in determining competence to plead guilty as
opposed to competence to stand trial, the majority of courts have
rejected the adoption of differing standards.3
A competent defendant has a constitutional right to waive
counsel and represent himself, 37 but courts must conduct an in-
FSIONAL RESPONSImLrrY, EC 7-12.
232. See generally Golten, supra note 59, at 408-09. For discussion of the tactical and
ethical considerations faced by defense counsel representing an incompetent client, see
Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CRM. L. REv.
505 (1972); Pizzi, supra note 115, at 57-64.
233. Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68, 68-70 (Fla. 1971), modified, 408 U.S. 938 (1972).
234. Suggs v. La Vallee, 570 F.2d 1092, 1116-17 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Mas-
them, 539 F.2d 721, 725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Osborne v. Thompson, 481 F. Supp. 162 (M.D.
Tenn. 1976), aff'd, 610 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1979); Quesada v. State, 321 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1975); People v. Matheson, 70 Mich. App. 172, 183-84, 245 N.W.2d 51, 70 (1976).
235. Saxton v. State, 284 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
236. E.g., Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Mc-
Gough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1975); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1006
(1973); Wolcott v. United States, 407 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879
(1969); Grennett v. United States, 403 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Clayton v. United States,
302 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1960); State v.
Contreras, 112 Ariz. 358, 542 P.2d 17 (1975); People v. Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 342 N.E.2d 34
(1976); People v. Belanger, 73 Mich. App. 438, 252 N.W.2d 472 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Miller, 454 Pa. 67, 309 A.2d 705 (1973). Contra, United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721,
726 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973) (higher standard of
competence required to plead); see Competence to Plead Guilty: A New Standard, 1974
DuKe L.J. 149.
237. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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quiry to ensure that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived the right while mentally competent. " The courts have rec-
ognized that a defendant may be competent to stand trial and yet
lack sufficient competence to proceed without counsel.2 39 The stan-
dard of competence to waive counsel is generally considered
stricter than the standard for competence to stand trial.2 4
A defendant competent to stand trial at the commencement of
his trial may well become incompetent during the proceedings. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that "a trial court must always be
alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the
accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand
trial. 24 1 Indeed, rule 3.210(b) requires a competency determina-
tion if reasonable grounds to question defendant's competence
emerge before or during the trial. Moreover, a defendant compe-
tent to stand trial may nonetheless become incompetent after his
conviction but before sentencing. The court may not sentence a
defendant while he is incompetent,'M and if the court or either
party raises reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's compe-
tence for sentencing, the court must inquire into the issue. 3 Such
an inquiry should focus on whether the defendant can meaning-
fully exercise his right of allocution, or comprehend the nature of
the sentencing proceedings.'' Under rule 3.740, when the court
has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant may be in-
competent for sentencing, it must postpone sentencing and "im-
mediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's
mental condition."'"25 It may appoint experts to examine the defen-
dant for this purpose and to testify at the hearing. In addition, the
parties may introduce other evidence on the defendant's mental
238. Ausby v. State, 359 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); McCain v. State, 275 So. 2d
596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); State v. Bauer, 310 Minn. 103, 104, 245 N.W.2d 848, 849 (1976).
239. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954).
240. Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam); United States ex rel.
Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 937 (1976); Silten
& Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1065-72
(1977). Contra, People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351, 334 N.E.2d 573, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1975).
241. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975).
242. Perkins v. Mayo, 92 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1957); Cioli v. State, 303 So. 2d 82, 83
(Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
243. Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 796 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
972 (1977); Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1976); People v. Catapano, 73
A.D.2d 975, 424 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1980).
244. Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d at 790.
245. FLA. R. Caium. P. 3.740(a).
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condition.2"
The state may not carry out a defendant's death sentence
while he is insane. 47 Thus, the Florida Statutes provide a similar
procedure to determine the defendant's capacity for execution.2 "
This section provides that when he receives information that a de-
fendant under sentence of death may be insane, the governor must
stay execution of the sentence and appoint a commission of three
psychiatrists to examine the defendant to determine whether he
understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and the
reasons for imposing it on him.2 " If after reviewing the report of
the psychiatrists, the governor finds that the defendant lacks this
capacity, he will order the defendant committed to a state hospital
until he is capable of such understanding.
250
If a reasonable doubt arises about the defendant's competence
at any other point in the criminal proceedings-for example, for
revocation of probation, 25  or revocation of parole252 -the court
must hold a hearing to determine the defendant's competence to
participate. Even at a pre-trial suppression hearing involving the
voluntariness of a confession, if anyone raises a reasonable doubt
concerning the defendant's mental competence to waive his rights,
the court must hold a hearing on the issue.2 53 A defendant in extra-
dition proceedings has also successfully asserted his incompetence
to assist counsel in challenging extradition. 4
IX. No SENTENCE CREDIT FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT TIME
A defendant adjudged incompetent to stand trial and commit-
ted for treatment to a hospital or retardation facility may spend a
considerable period of time in the facility before he regains his
246. Id.
247. Horace v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1959); Perkins v. Mayo, 92 So. 2d 641, 644
(Fla. 1957); State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 465-67, 152 So. 207, 211 (1933).
See generally Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompe-
tent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1980); Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533
(1979).
248. FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1979).
249. Id. § 922.07(1).
250. Id. §§ 922.07(3)-(4).
251. Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 274 (9th Cir. 1977); Hayes v. State, 343 So. 2d 672
(Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
252. Newcomb v. Metz, 64 A.D.2d 219, 409 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1978).
253. United States v. Silva, 418 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Jones v. District
Court, 617 P.2d 803, 807 (Colo. 1980) (competency at pre-trial motion stage).
254. Jones v. Warmuth, 272 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1980); Kostic v. Smedley, 522 P.2d 535
(Alaska 1974).
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competence and returns for trial. In Florida, however, the courts
do not credit such a period of hospitalization or placement against
the defendant's subsequent sentence.55 A number of other juris-
dictions follow a contrary practice, crediting such time spent hos-
pitalized against sentence." 6 Although Florida does not formally
provide such sentence credit, it is likely that at least some sentenc-
ing judges and parole boards will take this factor into account.257
X. CONCLUSION
The new Florida provisions on competence to stand trial con-
tain a number of significant reforms and innovations. To achieve
these reforms, however, defense attorneys must more vigorously
assert the rights of their incompetent clients, and working closely
with the district offices of the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services, county mental health boards must plan and press
for funding for new community-based programs to serve mentally
ill defendants.
Defendants and their attorneys involved in the incompetency
process rarely assert many of the legal rights that such defendants
possess. Although almost nine years has passed since the landmark
decision in Jackson v. Indiana,5 8 in many areas the states have
not faithfully followed the constitutional limits that the Supreme
Court placed on their power to commit incompetent defendants. 5
Neither judicial decisions nor rules adopted by legislatures or
courts are self-executing. Incompetent defendants are rarely aware
of their rights, and are uniquely unable to assert them. Defense
counsel, particularly busy public defenders, all too frequently ne-
glect their incompetent clients after commitment. 260
255. Dalton v. State, 362 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); cf. Dorman v. State, 351 So.
2d 954 (Fla. 1977) (period of hospitalization as mentally disordered sex offender under prior
statute not credited against sentence).
256. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1375.5 (West Supp. 1980); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.38(I) (Page Supp. 1979).
257. Henry Steadman's empirical study of the incompetency process in New York in-
cluded a comparison of the sentences received by a sample of defendants restored to compe-
tency and subsequently convicted with a sample of defendants convicted for similar offenses
who had never been found incompetent. H. STEADMAN, supra note 106, at 98-99. Steadman
found a "strong tendency" by judges to consider in their sentencing decisions the time spent
by incompetent defendants in maximum security mental hospitals, even though New York
law did not require that such time be deducted from the sentence. Id. See also Note, supra
note 4, at 678.
258. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
259. S. HALLECK, supra note 25, at 143; Slovenko, supra note 2, at 174.
260. See Gobert, supra note 6, at 666; Golten, supra note 59, at 408.
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As a result, many of the rights of the incompetent defendant
remain only theoretical. Defense lawyers need to master the intri-
cacies of the new provisions and assume responsibility for imple-
menting reforms and expediting the competency process. They can
accomplish these goals not only through the filing of motions and
lawsuits, but through lobbying and organizing as well. There is a
need to develop and expand special programs for mental health
advocacy, programs combining specially trained attorneys with so-
cial workers and other clinical and paraprofessional staff.
The new reforms, particularly those permitting outpatient
competency evaluation and treatment, will require vigorous legal
prodding of every appropriate decisionmaker if they are to be im-
plemented. In addition to asserting their clients' rights in court,
mental health lawyers must become sophisticated 'lobbyists, urging
local mental health boards and departments to develop and ex-
pand specialized forensic psychiatric services or court clinics to
perform outpatient competency evaluation. Because of the basic
economies of outpatient evaluation, such changes should receive
broad acceptance without the necessity of litigation.261
Outpatient treatment for the nondangerous incompetent de-
fendant in community settings, rather than state hospital wards,
has many advantages. Legal requirements combine with considera-
tions of therapeutic efficacy and economy to favor outpatient treat-
ment for many incompetent defendants presently hospitalized. De-
fense attorneys should help persuade community mental health
centers and outpatient hospital programs to accept the criminal
patients they have traditionally shunned. More funding is needed
for group homes and other specialized therapeutic residential pro-
grams for forensic patients. The process of deinstitutionalization,
recently having gained momentum in the civil mental health deliv-
ery system, should not bypass the forensic hospitals.262 The partial
deinstitutionalizing of the overcrowded state hospital forensic
wards can only improve these facilities, permitting them to use
their limited resources more effectively to restore competence more
rapidly for defendants requiring hospitalization.
The new reforms, if implemented with enthusiasm, can thus
transform the competency process, moving competency evaluation
and treatment from the state hospitals to the communities. This
261. See D. WEXLER, supra note 6, at 39-41; Statement by Bruce J. Winick Before
New York State Legislature Select Committee on Mental and Physical Handicap 1-2 (Jan.
17, 1974) (unpublished report located at University of Miami School of Law).
262. See D. WEXLER, supra note 6, at 4-6.
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movement can greatly improve the efficiency and quality of evalua-
tion and treatment, expediting the return of incompetent defend-
ants to court, where they may face their charges. Rather than the
typical lengthy competency commitment, expeditious return to
court will serve the best interests both of defendants and of the
state.
